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POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE MAJOR 
ISSUE OF THE TRIAL, NAMELY THE ISSUE OF ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. AMPLE EVIDENCE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS 
PRESENTED, AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT 
RESPONDENT WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY THE DOCTRINE OF 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ADDITIONAL 
AMOUNTS UNDER THE CONTRACT AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES. 
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT IT 
WAS THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IN MAKING ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION TO FULLY EXTINGUISH ALL LIABILITY TO EACH OTHER. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE THAT 
RESPONDENT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT 
THE "EXTRA WORK" FOR WHICH RESPONDENT MADE A CLAIM WAS 
ACTUALLY WORK CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR THE RESPONDENT ON 
THE ISSUE OF THE "EXTRA WORK." THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF APPELLANT'S LIABILITY SINCE THERE WAS NO 
VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT FOR THE 
EXTRA WORK. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
VALID OFFSET THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD ABSORB. AMPLE EVIDENCE 
WAS PRESENTED TO WARRANT AN OFFSET SHOULD A CONTRACT HAVE 
BEEN FOUND TO EXIST. 
:ONCLUSION 
,DDENDUM ; . ; 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Bennion v. LeGrandJohns Construction Company. 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 
985). 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 260 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977). 
County of Maricopa v. Walsh and Oberg Architects. Inc.. 16 Ariz.App. 
194 p. 44 (AhZ. 1972). 
Interocean Shipping Company v. National Shipping and Trading 
:orporation (2nd Cir. 1975) 523 R.2d 527. 
Krieg v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation. 525 P.2d 43 (Or, 
1974). 
Quealy v. Anderson. 714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986). 
OTHER AUTHORITES CITED 
1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 1, pp. 301-302. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE MAJOR 
ISSUE OF THE TRIAL, NAMELY THE ISSUE OF ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION? WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SUPPORT A 
RULING BV THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS BARRED FROM 
RECOVERY BY THE DOCTRINE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION? 
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11 . 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN AWARDING ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS 
UNDER THE CONTRACT? DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES TO RESPONDENT? DOES A FINDING OF ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION EXTINGUISH ALL LIABILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE THAT 
RESPONDENT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT? WAS AMfLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO 
SUPPORT THE RULLING THAT THE "EXTRA WORK" FOR WHICH 
RESPONDENT MADE A CLAIM WAS ACTUALLY WORK CONTAINED IN THE 
CONTRACT? 
IV. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING APPELLANT LIABLE 
FOR THE EXTRA WORK PERFORMED BY RESPONDENT? DOES THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID 
CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT FOR THE EXTRA 
WORK? 
V. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
VALID OFFSET? WAS THERE AMPLE EVIDENCE TO WARRANT AN 
OFFSET SHOULD A CONTRACT BEEN FOUND TO EXIST? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Abco Construction, Inc., is a Utah coporation with i ts 
principal place of business in Box Elder County, Utah. Through its 
Secretary-Treasurer, Branson Neff, Appellant entered into a prime contract 
with the Uintah County School District ("School pistrict") to construct an 
auditorium addition ("the project") to the West junior High School in Uintah 
County. 
Respondent, Peters & Company, is a painting contractor. Through i ts 
President, Ted Peters, Respondent submitted a bid to provide all labor, 
equipment, material and services to complete the; painting for the project. 
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T. 10). Respondent's painting bid was accepted. The painting Respondent 
;ontracted to do was begun in the first part of February., 1985, (T. 11) under 
:he direction of Respondent's paint foreman.. Craig Talbot. (T. 113) Toward 
the end of February, 1985, the painting had been substantially completed (T. 
4). On or about March 22, 1985, a written subcontract agreement for the 
painting was signed by Appellant, as general contractor of the project, and 
by Respondent. (T. 30). The contract price was $9,305. (T. 11). Also as part 
of the contract was the guarantee that Respondent would complete the work 
in accordance with the plans and specifications. (T. 11). Respondent further 
promised to make corrections or fix-ups as required. (T. 29 & 30). 
During work on the project, Appellant had trouble with the metal 
doors and the hardware for the doors. Some of the hard-ware didn't align 
with the pre-drilled holes in the doors. Consequently, some of the holes 
needed to be redrilled to accommodate the hardware, and some of the pre-
drilled holes had to be filled with putty and sanded before the doors could be 
painted. (T. 32, 106). Also, some of the doors were dented and rusting so 
they needed to be sanded and primed before they could be painted (T. 33). 
Because of the conditions of the doors, Respondent told Appellant there 
would be a charge for the additional preparatory work on the doors. In the 
presence of Mr. Talbot, Respondent's paint foreman. Respondent and 
Appellant negotiated an agreeable solution: Appellant would furnish the 
materials and the equipment and Respondent would supply the labor. (T. 107-
108). No further discussion about the doors took place, but then, in an 
invoice dated November 10, 1986, Respondent submitted to Appellant a 
$2660 claim for the preparatory work on the doors. 
On or about February 20, 1985 (T. 14) Respondent received a 
telephone call from Mr. Randy Green ("the Architect"), senior achitect with 
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Respondent completed the brick sealing around the first of March, 
985. (T. 16). Then Respondent began submitting separate invoices for the 
rick sealing to the architect (T. 21 & 73) and to Appellant. (T. 16). 
Although Respondent considered the brick sealing completed, the 
irchitect was dissatisfied with the results (T. 76 & 85) because drywall 
nud, stains (T. 113), paint drippings (T. 58), and white dust that appeared to 
)e from the sanding of the drywall (T. 77), had been sealed into the brick. 
[J. 77). Upon close inspection, Respondent's work was rejected by the 
architect (T. 83-85), by Mr. Mark Trussler, another architect supervising the 
project (T. 76), and by Dirk Harris, the School District representative on 
construction projects. (T. 153). On April 4, 1985, Mr. Trussler prepared a 
punch list itemizing things to be corrected and/or completed on the project, 
including the unsatisfactory sealing work on the brick walls. (T. 87-88). 
The punch list read: "Clean brick walls where brick sealer was applied over 
dirt and dust." (T. 124, 149). Because Craig Talbot, Respondent's paint 
foreman at the project site (103), refused to strip the sealer and clean the 
dirty brick walls (T. 150), Appellant telephoned Respondent and requested 
that Respondent send someone more cooperative to remedy the problems 
with the sealed bricks. (T. 151). 
Almost two weeks passed before Respondent and his crew returned to 
the project site. (T. 118). By then Appellant and his crew (T. 49) had spent 
97-1/2 hours (T. 48 & 152) trying various methods such as acid washes (T. 
115) and wire brushes (T. 49) to strip the sealer off the brick. Upon his 
arrival to the project site, Respondent said he would take over from that 
point. (T. 49) 
On April 20, 1985, Respondent submitted an invoice to Appellant for 
work completed on the project. This invoice indicated a balance of 
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$1,013.86, which was the balance owing on the contract. This invoice 
included no other charge for any "extra work" such as the brick sealing 
Respondent had negotiated with the architect to do or the additional door 
preparatory work Respondent resolved with Appellant or the brick stripping 
and cleaning. (T. 18). Respondent was sending invoices for the brick 
cleaning directly to the architect (T. 20, 22, 71) and the School District. (T. 
5, 16). 
Respondent sent subsequent invoices to Appellant. These invoices 
always separated the amount due for the work completed under the contract 
from the amount due for the brick cleaning: $1,013.86 for the balance on the 
contract and $2,780.00 for the brick cleaning. (T. 21). [Note: The charge of 
$2,780.00 for the brick cleaning and/or stripping did not reflect the amount 
in the change order which was for $2,640. (T. 22& 23).] 
In July or August of 1985, Respondent, with the express intention of 
settling the matter of the balance due on the contract, telephoned Appellant. 
(T. 23-25 & 44). Appellant informed Respondent that Appellant would send a 
check for the balance owing on the contract but that there were some back 
charges for Appellant's having spent 97-1/2 hours at $20.00 per hour (T. 
152&153) stripping the sealer off and cleaning the dirty brick walls. After 
some discussion, Appellant and Respondent negotiated a final settlement of 
$931.00. (T. 26, 45). During the negotiation, Appellant and Respondent also 
reached the understanding that Appellant owed Respondent nothing for the 
brick cleaning unless and until the School District made payment to 
Appellant for this work. (T. 45). 
Based on this negotiation. Appellant prepared (with blue ink) the 
check for the agreed settlement of $931.00 and circled the words "in full" 
on the back of the check. (T. 46, 53, 157). Appellant's circling of the words 
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n full" distinguished this particular check from any of the previous checks 
espondent had received from Appellant (T. 54, 55). Respondent received 
his check on August 6, 1985 (T. 45), and with red ink, Respondent endorsed 
he check. (T. 53). Respondent testified at trial that this check for the 
legotiated amount of $931.00 was "payment in full under the contract." (T. 
176). 
Meanwhile, Respondent continued billing the Architect and the School 
District for the cleaning of the brick walls. (T. 21, 73). However, the 
School District's policy was that requests for payment of work done outside 
a contract would not be honored unless and until the change order was 
completed and approved. (T. 63 & 69). 
Maintaining that Respondent was responsible under the contract for 
cleaning the brick walls (T. 148, 154), the School District ultimately 
rejected the change order. (T. 148, 153). The explanation for this rejection 
was that the cleaning of the brick walls before the application of the sealer 
was the painter's responsibility. (T. 148,154). Consequently, neither 
Respondent nor Appellant received payment from the School District for the 
brick cleaning. (T. 157). 
In spite of Appellant's payment in full under the contract (T. 176), 
Respondent submitted an invoice dated November 10, 1986, to Appellant, in 
the invoice. Respondent made a $2,660 claim for Respondent's preparatory 
work on the project's metal doors. (T. 36). This invoice was the first notice 
Appellant had received after paying the settlement check of $931.00 that 
Respondent considered any further amount owing. (T. 36). This invoice also 
was the first notice Appellant had received since the solution negotiated 
for the door preparations. Respondent admitted at trial that this work 
claimed in the invoice was work Respondent performed under the original 
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contract work; the claim was not for any of the brick sealing or cleaning. (T. 
37,47). The Architect also testified at trial that these "extras" for which 
Respondent was billing were not "extras" but, rather, was work that was 
part of the contract (T. 72). Moreover, Respondent admitted at trial that the 
billing for 'work on the doors was made after Respondent had released 
Appellant on the contract. (T. 47). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to rule that Respondent was barred 
from recovery by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Although 
Appellant pled accord and satisfaction, the trial court did not rule on the 
issue. Ample evidence was presented that Respondent and Appellant 
negotiated a final settlement for work on the contract and also for the brick 
sealing. The agreed settlement was for $931.00. Appellant prepared a 
check for this amount and circled the words "in full" on the back of the 
check, and Respondent accepted and endorsed the check. Appellant's circling 
of the words "in full" distinguished this final check from previous checks 
Respondent had received from Appellant. Furthermore, Respondent testified 
several times at trial that this final check constituted "a payment in full on 
the contract" and "a release of Appellant" from all further claims. 
The trial court erred in awarding additional amounts under the 
contract. The "extra work" of preparing the doors for painting was actually 
work required under the contract. Respondent sent the first invoice for this 
work more than a year after a release of Appellant from all further claims. 
As the evidence and testimony given at trial supported a finding of accord 
and satisfaction with regards to the final settement, Respondent should 
have been barred from recovery. Likewise, Respondent should have been 
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barred from claiming attorney fees assessed for litigating an already 
negotiated and satisfied claim. 
Respondent's contract with Appellant contained a provision that 
required the painter to examine surfaces which were scheduled to be 
painted, stained, varnished, etc. and to report to the contractor any surfaces 
which could not be put into proper condition for finishing by customary 
preparation. The provision further stated that the application of the first 
coat would "constitute acceptance of surfaces as fit and proper to receive 
finish." Thus, Respondent had the responsibility to ensure that the brick 
walls were properly prepared before the application of the sealer, and 
Respondent's application of the sealer constituted his acceptance of the 
condition of the walls. Consequently, when the work was inspected and 
rejected, Respondent had no valid basis upon which to make a claim for the 
stripping and subsequent cleaning of the dirty brick walls. 
The "extra work" of sealing and cleaning the brick walls -was work 
Respondent negotiated with the Architect to do. The Architect telephoned 
Respondent asking that Respondent bid on "extra work" which consisted of 
adding a sealer to the interior brick walls in the project and other specified 
rooms in the school. During the course of the negotiation, Respondent gave 
the Architect a bid of $2641.00, and the Architect accepted the bid. At no 
time was Appellant party to the negotiations, nor did Appellant sanction 
them or the contract. Consequently, Appellant cannot be held liable for 
payments under a contract the Architect instigated and finalized with 
Respondent. 
Even if the trial court were correct in ruling that Respondent was 
entitled to payments for the extra work, Appellant was entitled to a ruling 
that there was an offset. This offset resulted because Respondent was 
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almost two weeks in returning to the project to strip and clean the dirty 
brick walls and the delay was stopping other subcontractors from 
continuing their work. Consequently, Appellant and his crew had to spend 
97-1/2 hours at a cost of $20.00 attempting to remedy Respondent's poor 
workmanship. The total cost to Appellant was $1950 00. This cost should 
have been deducted from any award to Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE MAJOR ISSUE OF 
THE TRIAL, NAMELY THE ISSUE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. AMPLE 
EVIDENCE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS PRESENTED, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT RESPONDENT WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
The Court in Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Company. 701 
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985) indicated that accord andjsatisfaction arises when: 
.. .the parties to a contract mutually agree that a 
different performance than that required by the original 
contract w i l l be made in substitution of the performance 
originally agreed upon and that the substituted agreement 
calling for the different performance wi l l discharge the 
obligation created under the original agreement. Id. at 1082. 
A similar definition is that "(a)n accord and satisfaction is a method 
of discharging a contract or settling a claim arising from a contract by 
substituting for such contract or claim an agreement for the satisfaction 
thereof, and the execution of the substituted agreement." Cannon v. Stevens 
School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977). 
Another definition is as follows: 
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To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must be an offer-
In full satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied by such acts and 
declarations as amount to a condition that if it is accepted, it is to 
be in full satisfaction, and the condition must be such that the party 
to w h o m the offer is made is bound to understand that if he accepts 
it, he does so subject to the conditions imposed The accord is the 
agreement and the satisfaction is the execution or performance of 
such agreement 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 1, pp. 
301-302. 
Appellant's advocacy of an accord and satisfaction in the present 
case is based on four propositions: Respondent's contacting of Appellant in 
July or August of 1985, the actual negotiation which resulted in a 
settlement agreement, Respondent's endorsement of Appellant's final 
$931.00 check, and Respondent's repeated admissions during cross-
examination at trial. 
In July or August of 1985, Respondent telephoned Appellant with the 
express intent of settling the balance on the contract work and also the 
work of sealing and cleaning the brick walls. Appellant informed 
Respondent that there were some back charges for Appellant's time spent 
trying to strip the sealer off the dirty brick walls. Respondent responded by 
indicating that he had not yet been paid for the brick sealing to which 
Appellant replied that if and when the School District made payment to 
Appellant for this work, Appellant would pay Respondent. The negotiation of 
claims and offsets resulted in a mutual determination that $931.00 was 
owing to Respondent. 
Appellant prepared a check for the negotiated amount and then circled 
the words "in full" on the back of the check. Respondent admitted at trial 
that Appellant's circling of the words "in full" distinguished this final check 
from any of the previous checks Respondent had received from Appellant. 
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With the circled words "in full" appearing on the back of the check, 
Respondent accepted and endorsed it. 
Besides Respondent's endorsement of the final check, Respondent 
repeatedly admitted during cross-examination at trial that the $931.00 
represented "payment in full on the contract" and a "release of Appellant" 
from all further claims. Respondent's admissions should have been given 
considerable v/eight by the trial court since these admissions contradicted 
Respondent's claim that payment was stil l owing for work Respondent 
admitted was performed under the contract. 
Besides the above propositions supporting a finding of accord and 
satisfaction, there was the traditional contract element: a meeting of the 
minds on this negotiated agreement between Appellant and Respondent. 
Moreover, Respondent's endorsement of Appellant's final check itself 
constituted an accord and satisfaction. Therefore, it is of no legal 
consequence that Respondent may have later regarded the check as 
something short of "full payment." The court in Marton Remodeling v. 
Jensen. 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) considered a similar situation. In that 
case, Marton received a check from Jensen that he did not regard as payment 
in full even though the check contained a condition that "endorsement hereof 
constitutes full and final satisfaction." As he endorsed the check, Marton 
added the words "not full payment" below the condition. The court ruled 
that". . . the creditor may not disregard the condition attached." Id. at 609. 
Applying this to the present case: Appellant's check contained the 
Respondent words "in full" circled on the back; consequently. Respondent 
cannot now refute the condition for acceptance of that check. 
Based upon the above definitions of accord and satisfactionand based 
upon the evidence and the testimony presented at trial, it would be safe to 
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conclude that an accord and satisfaction did arise and that the trial court 
srred in failing to rule that Respondent was barred from recovery by the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ADDITIONAL 
AMOUNTS UNDER THE CONTRACT AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES. AMPLE 
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT IT WAS THE 
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IN MAKING ACCORD AND SATISFACTION TO FULLY 
EXTINGUISH ALL LIABILITY TO EACH OTHER. 
The trial court awarded Respondent $2641.00 for the preparatory 
work done to the metal doors. Testimony given at trial by the Architect 
supported Appellant's contention that this work was work under the 
contract and as such was not "extra work." Even so, Appellant made 
concessions when Respondent made a claim in anticipation of having to do 
additional preparatory work on some of the doors: Appellant would furnish 
the materials and the equipment and the Respondent would supply the labor. 
Then, over a year later, Appellant received notice in the form of an invoice 
that Respondent considered some further amount owing. In an invoice dated 
November 10, 1986, Respondent submitted to Appellant a $2660 claim for 
the preparatory work done to the doors. Given the fact that this was 
contract work and given the fact that Respondent admitted at trial that the 
billing for work on the doors was after the release of Appellant of any 
further liability on the contract, this claim never should have been honored 
by the trial court. 
Furthermore, accord and satisfaction would have extinguished all 
liability between the parties, including attorney fees Evidence and 
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testimony presented at trial support the conclusion that it was the 
intention of Appellant and Respondent to fully extinguish all liability to 
each other arising out of their contract. This extinguishment of liability 
included liability for attorney fees assessed tor litigation prusued on the 
contract. See, eg., Quealy v. Anderson. 714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986). 
Had the court properly ruled that there was an accord and 
satisfaction, neither the award for preparatory work to the doors nor the 
award for attorney fees would have been granted. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE THAT 
RESPONDENT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN 
THE CONTRACT. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL THAT THE 
"EXTRA WORK" FOR WHICH RESPONDENT MADE A C1AIM WAS ACTUALLY WORK 
CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACT. 
Respondent's painting contract with Appelant contained the 
following provisions: 
3.1 Inspection 
3.1.1 Condition of Surfaces, the painter shall examine 
surfaces which are scheduled to receive paint, stain, varnish or 
other coatings and report to the contrator any surfaces which 
cannot be put into proper condition for finishing by customary 
cleaning, sanding, puttying, or other similar preparation 
operation. Application of the first coat shall constitute 
acceptance of surfaces as f i t and proper to receive finish. 
3.2 Surface Preparation I 
3.2.1. Remove hardware, machine surfaces, plates, 
lighting fixtures and similar items wehich are not to be 
painted, or apply protective coverings before commencing 
surface preparation. Re-install these items in each room after 
painting is complete and dry. 
3.2.2 Clean surfaces free of dirt, rust, scale, grease and 
moisture. (T. 85-86). 
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Before Respondent began sealing the brick walls, he had the 
'esponsibility to ensure that the surfaces were clean and properly prepared 
'or the sealer application; this surface preparation was part of the work 
Respondent contracted to do. By failing to so prepare the brick walls, 
Respondent breached a condition of his contract. 
Because of the poor workmanship, the work was rejected by the 
architects and by the School District construction project representative 
Subsequently, the sealer had to be stripped and the brick walls cleaned 
before the sealer could be reapplied. Because Respondent's painting foreman 
refused to do the work and because it was almost two weeks before 
Respondent returned to the project site, much of this work was completed 
by Appellent and his crews. 
As with the wall preparation, Respondent likewise had the 
contractual duty to prepare the doors for painting. All surface preparation 
to the doors was contract work. However, Appellant conceeded that some 
of the doors required additional preparation, so Appellant proposed an 
agreeable solution with Appellant providing the materials and the equipment 
and Respondent furnishing the labor. 
Appellant had already paid Respondent in the final $931.00 payment 
for the work completed under the contract; this payment constituted a 
payment in full. By ignoring this payment and the specifications contained 
in the contract, the trial court's award to Respondent of $2,641.00 for the 
brick cleaning and sealing and/or the door preparation constituted, in 
essence, a double payment for the same work. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR RESPONDENT ON THE ISSUE OF 
THE "EXTRA WORK." THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
FINDING OF APPELLANT'S LIABILITY SINCE THERE WAS NO VALID CONTRACT 
BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT FOR THE "EXTRA WORK". 
The evidence presented at trial supported Appellant's contention that 
preparatory work on the doors was work under the contract. As work under 
the contract, it was paid for in full when Appellant tendered the final check 
on Augusts, 1985. 
The other work described during the trial as "extra work" was the 
sealing and/or cleaning of the brick walls. Testimony at trial revealed that 
on or about February 20, 1985, Respondent received a telephone call from 
Mr. Randy Green ("the Architect"). The Architect asked that Respondent bid 
on extra work which consisted of adding a sealer to the interior brick walls 
in the project and other specified rooms in the school. (T. 13). In the course 
of the negotiation (T. 17, 64, 74) for the extra work, Respondent quoted a 
price which the Architect accepted. [The trial records indicate that 
Respondent testified that the price was "$2780.00" (T. 15) whereas the 
Architect testified that the price was "$2,641.00" (T. 65).] At no time 
during the negotiation between Respondent and the Architect did Appellant 
become a party. (T. 51). Neither did Appellant sanction the negotiation nor 
the resulting contract. (T. 162). 
Earlier in the project, the Architect had asked Appellant when he was 
going to seal the brick walls and was told by Appellant that he was not 
going to seal them. When the Architect asked why not, Appellant explained 
that the contract did not provide for the sealing of the bricks. 
Consequently, Appellant was surprised when Respondent, having completed 
17 
he contracted work and left the project site, appeared again and announced 
hat he was to seal the bricks. (T. 145). 
Respondent initially billed only the Architect (T. 20, 22, 71) and the 
School District (T. 5, 16) for the brick sealing. Only later did he begin 
including this work on invoices to Appellant. Then, the invoices separated 
this work from work completed under the contract. 
It is well established in Utah as elsewhere that whether there is a 
binding contract depends on the intent of the parties. The Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin formulated it thus: "There is no meeting of the minds where the 
parties do not to contract '* Interocean Shipping Company v National 
Shipping and Trading Corporation (2nd Cir. 1975) 523 F.2d 527. 
Furthermore, the general rule is that". . . no recovery can be had for 
extra work or materials unless performed or supplied with the knowledge 
and consent of the party to be held liable." Krieg v. Union Pacific Land 
Resources Corporation. 525 P.2d 48, 54 (Or. 1974). 
The evidence and the testimony presented at trial did not support a 
finding of a valid contract between Appellant and Respondent for the "extra 
work." Consequently, the trial court erred in founding Appellant liable for 
extra work for which he did not contract. 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID 
OFFSET THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD ABSORB. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS 
PRESENTED TO WARRANT AN OFFSET SHOULD A CONTRACT BE FOUND TO 
EXIST. 
Evidence was presented at trial that Respondent had applied sealer 
on bricks that were stained, splattered with paint and drywall mud, and 
coated with white dust that appeared to be from the sanding of the drywall. 
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Upon inspection by the architects and School District representative, the 
work was rejected. This su.. ition never would have occurred had 
Respondent not breached the condition of his contract dealing with 
preparation of surfaces before painting. 
As a result of Respondent's poor workmanship jnd delay in returning 
to re-do the work, Appellant and his crew spent 97-1/2 hours at a cost of 
$20.00 per hour stripping the sealer off and cleaning dirty brick walls. The 
total cost of their labor was $ 1950 
There is a well-established '"cost of repair" rule. This rule relates to 
damages applicable to breach of construction contracts:"... dama.jes are 
awarded based upon the reasonable cost of construction and completion in 
accordance with the contract." County of Man cor . v Walsh and Oberg 
Architects. Inc., 16 Ariz.App 439, 494 P.2d 44, 46 (Ariz. 1972:' 
If a valid accord and satisfaction did not arise and if Appellant was 
liable under aa valid contract for the extra work, then the trial court should 
have reduced Respondent's award by -he $ 1" 50 it cent Appellant to remedy 
Respondent's poor workmanship 
CONCLL 'JOJ, 
The trial court's award to Respondent of $2,641 plus interest ^n 
attorney fees should be set aside 
The case should be remanded for a resolution of the following issues: 
Did an accord and satisfaction J; ise? 
In the alternative: 
Was a valid contract for the extra work made between 
Appellant and Repondent? If so, What amount of off et against the contract 
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)rder Amending Judgment dated January 9, 1987 
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DATED this 18th day of May, 1987. 
Q„ p 
DALEMTDORTUS 
Attorney for Appellant 
P. 0. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brighara City, UT 84302 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Served the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing four 
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to E. H. FANKHAUSER, Attorney 
for Respondent, 660 South 200 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111 this 18th day of May, 1987. 
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E. H. FANKHAUSER. 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT 
PETERS & COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, * FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, * 
Civil No. 86 CV 067 
vs. * 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC., * 
BRANSON G. NEFF, FRED A. 
MORTON & COMPANY, AMERICAN * 
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING 
PENNSYLVANIA, DANA LARSON * 
ROUBAL & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
* 
Defendants. 
Trial of this action was held at a regular term of the 
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, November 24, 1986 
without jury, before the Honorable Whitney D. Hammond. 
Plaintiff corporation was represented by its attorney, 
E. H. Fankhauser. Defendants' ABCO Construction, Inc., 
Branson G. Neff, Fred A. Morton & Company, American Casualty 
Company of Reading Pennsylvania and Dana Larson Roubal & 
Associates were represented by their attorney, Dale M. 
-1-
Dorius. Each o£ the parties presented witnesses that were 
duly sworn and testified; and each of the parties presented 
evidence to the Court which was received and adduced by the 
Court; and the matter having been argued and submitted to the 
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, 
having considered the testimony and evidence presented, being 
fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing 
finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant, ABCO Construction Company, is a Utah 
Corporation and as such entered into a contract with the 
Uintah County School District to construct improvements at 
the West Valley Jr. High School located in Uintah County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Peters & Company entered into a subcontract 
agreement in writing with Defendant, ABCO Construction 
Company, to provide labor and material for the painting 
required to be done in connection with the construction of 
the auditorium addition at the West Jr. High School under 
ABCO's contract with Uintah County School District. 
3. Plaintiff, Peters & Company, performed services, 
labor and furnished material to do the painting under its 
subcontract at the agreed price of $9,305.00. 
4. Peters & Company, at the time the work was 
performed, was a licensed painting contractor with the State 
-2-
of Dtah. 
5. The work performed by Plaintiff under its original 
subcontract was completed on or about April 9, 1985 and met 
the standards in the industry. 1 
6. Plaintiff, at the request of Randy Green, the 
supervising architect, submitted a bid to do extra work 
consisting of sealing brick walls, which bid was accepted by 
the architects, ABCO Construction, the contractor and the 
owner, Uintah County School District* 
7. The labor performed and material furnished in 
applying sealer to the auditorium side walls, halls, rooms 
101, 102, 103, 104, 108 and 109, the music room and sorting 
room, amounted to $2,641*00. The work was substantially 
completed on or about March 5, 1985. 
8. A portion of the work was unacceptable to the 
architect. Plaintiff performed the required corrective work, 
which was approved and accepted by the architect, and the 
extra of sealing the walls was completed on or about April 1, 
1985. 
9. Defendants have the burden of showing what work, if 
any, did not meet standards in the industry and present 
evidence of any claimed off sets. 
10. Plaintiff has been paid for the labor performed and 
materials furnished except for the extra of sealing the 
walls. There remains due and owing to Plaintiff the sum of 
$2,641.00 as of August 1, 1985. 
-3-
11. ABCO Gonstruction, and the owner, Uintah County 
School District, signed the change order for the extra of 
sealing the walls on or about July 12, 1985. Payment for the 
extra to Plaintiff became due and payable on or about August 
1, 1985. 
12. Defendant, Fred A. Morton Company, as agent for 
American Casualty Company, provided a payment and performance 
bond as required by Title 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, to insure payment for all labor and materials in 
connection with the construction of the auditorium addition 
at the West Jr. High School, Uintah County, Utah, under the 
contract between ABCO Construction Company and the Uintah 
County School District. 
13. Plaintiff sent several statements to Defendant, 
ABCO Construction Company and Dana Larson Roubal & Associates 
for payment of the extra owing to Plaintiff. Demand was made 
upon ABCO Construction on or about August 26, 1985 and on or 
about November 29, 1985. Plaintiff has incurred costs and 
attorney's fees in connection with the bringing and 
prosecution of this action. A reasonable sum to be awarded 
Plaintiff as attorney's fees is $800.00. 
14. Defendants', Branson G. Neff, individually and Dana 
Larson Rouball & Associates were not parties to the said 
contract between Plaintiff and ABCO Construction for the 
painting and the extra of sealing the walls. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court concludes 
-4-
as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant, ABCO Construction, Inc., contracted with 
Plaintiff to perform labor and furnish materials in doing 
painting work in connection with the construction of the 
auditorium addition at the West Jr. High School. 
2. There is due and owing to Plaintiff for labor and 
materials for the extra work of sealing the walls the sum of 
$2,641.00, with accrued interest at the legal rate of 10% per 
annum from August 1, 1985. 
3. Judgment should be entered against Defendants, ABCO 
Construction Company, Inc., Fred A. Morton Company and 
American Casaulty Company, in favor of Plaintiff in the sum 
of $2,641.00 plus accrued interest from August 1, 1985 to 
November 30, 1986 at the rate of 10% per annum in the amount 
of $352.50. 
4. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment for attorney's 
fees against Defendants, ABCO Construction Company, 
Fred A. Morton Company and American Casualty Company, 
in the sum of $800.00. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment for its costs, 
together with post judgment interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum from the date of judgment until the judgment is 
-5-
paid in full. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of December, 1986, 
BY THE COURT: 
WHITNEY D. HAMMOND 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, P.O. Box U 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 in accordance with Rule 2.9, Rules 
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E. H. FANKHAUSERf 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT 
PETERS & COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, * 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, * 
Civil No. 86 CV 067 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
BRANSON G. NEFF, FRED A. 
MORTON & COMPANY, AMERICAN 
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING 
PENNSYLVANIA, DANA LARSON 
ROUBAL & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the 
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, without jury, on 
November 24, 1986, the Honorable Whitney D. Hammond 
presiding. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, 
E. H. Fankhauser. Defendants were represented by their 
attorney, Dale M. Dorius. Each of the parties presented 
witnesses that were duly sworn and testified; and presented 
evidence that was received and adduced by the Court; and the 
-1-
matter having be^n argued and submitted to the Court for its 
determination and decision; and the Court, after 
consideration of the testimony and evidence presented made 
and entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
now, therefore, in accordance therewith: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment against 
Defendants, ABCO Construction Company, Inc., Fred A. Morton 
Company and American Casualty Company for the sum of 
$2,641.00, together with accrued interest from August 1, 1985 
to November 30, 1986 at the rate of 10% per annum in the 
amount of $352*50. 
2. Judgment for attorney's fees for the use and benefit 
of Plaintiff's attorney against Defendants, ABCO 
Construction, Fred A, Morton Company and American Casualty 
Company in the sum of $800.00. 
3. For Plaintiff's costs of Court assessed at $218.75, 
said judgments to bear interest from the date hereof until 
paid in full at the judgment rate of 12% per annum. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of December, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 




I certifya true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, 
P.O. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84302, in accordance with Rule 
2.9, Rules of Practice, on this day of December, 1986. 
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E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
0*1* M. Doriuft Al* 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT 
PETERS & COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
BRANSON G. NEFF, FRED A. 
MORTON & COMPANY, AMERICAN 
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING 
PENNSYLVANIA, DANA LARSON 




ORDER AMENDING JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86 CV 067 
Defendants1 Motion for New Trial, having been denied by 
Order of the Court dated December 30, 1986; and said Order having 
provided that the Judgment, in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants 
should be amended by Order to specifically provide that Plaintiff 
had no cause of action against Defendants, Branson G. Neff, as an 
individual or Dana, Larson, Roubal & Associates, Inc.; and that 
Plaintiff's action against said Defendants should be dismissed 
with prejudice; now, in accordance therewith: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the action of 
laintiff against Defendants, Branson G. Neff, individually and 
efendant, Dana, Larson, Roubal & Associates, Inc., be dismissed 
ith prejudice for no cause of action in that said Defendants 
rere not parties to the contract between Plaintiff and ABCO 
Construction, Inc., for the painting and extra of sealing the 
The Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Peters & Company, Inc., 
against ABCO Construction, Inc., Fred A. Morton & Company, and 
American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania heretofore 
entered by this Court shall remain in full force and effect until 
satisfied. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this ^r day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
&L 
WHITNEY D. HAMMOND 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, 29 South Main 














PROJECT: WEST JR . HIGH SCHOOL 






Route 1, Box 116 
Corrine, Utah 84307 
~l 
CHANGE ORDER NUMBER: 6-5 
INITIATION DATE: March 6, 1985 
ARCHITECT'S PROJECT NO: 4510283 
CONTRACT FOR: General Constructio 
I CONTRACT DATE: March 5, 1984 
You are directed to make the following changes in this Contract: 
1. Add one coat of Chem-Stop brick sealer to interior brick walls: 
a. To ceiling height in rooms 101, 102, 103, 104 (new brick), 108, 
109, 119 and 122. 
b. To elevation 107'-4" in Rooms 110, 113, 114 and 115. 
Price as approved by telephone conversation between Randy Green (DLRA) and 
Ted Peters (Peters & Co.) 2/22/84 and authorized by Dirk Harris (Uintah 
School District) 2/22/85. 
Add $2,641 
SUMMARY: 
Finish Allowance $ 10,000.00 
Less Previous Changes - 3,351.15 
Less This Change - 2,641.00 
REMAINING ALLOWANCE $ 4,007.85 
Not valid until signed by both the Owner and Architect. 
Signature of the Contractor indicates his agreement herewith, including any adjustment in the Contract Sum or Contract Time. 
The original (Contract Sum) (CXOfem&<^&WXi)WtWmM was $ 1 ,009 ,233 .01 
Net change by previously authorized Change Orders $ ( 308 ,495 ,6 
The (Contract Sum) («X*XttmXaUUfXffltmK prior to this Change Order was $ 700,737 .3: 
The (Contract Sum) (f^XMM*&***£&****£&*) will be (toKfeK&d* (&&&&*&$ (unchanged) 0( 
by this Change Order $ 
The new (Contract Sum) (gltfXX^tf JU&XXttKXXXM including this Change .Order will be . . . $ 7 00,7 37 .32 
The Contract Time will be (iXXttX$9) (<?8fcX<£K&X (unchanged) by. ( 0 ) Days. 
The Date of Substantial Completion as of the date of this Change Order therefore is 
Authorized: 
DANA LARSON ROUBAL & ASSOC. ABCO CONSTRUCTION • UINTAH HIGH SCHOOL 
A O T g & So. Temple ToNuTCTRBox 116 ffCTest 200 South 
ffiCT UT 8 M ^ o o t e v e l t , Utah , , ^ f l , Utah 84078 
P A T ' X ^ ^ DATE 7 - / ? - ^ DATE 
AIA DOCUMENT G701 • CHANCE ORDER • APRIL 1976 EDITION • AIA« • © 1978 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 3735 NEW YORK AVE., N V\ \\ \SHINCTON, D C 20006 G701 — 1978 
P A I N T I N G & D E C O R A T I N G 
o u t h R i c h a r d s S t r e e t • S a l t L a k e C i t y U t a h 8 4 1 0 1 • 8 0 1 - 3 5 5 - 2 5 0 0 
February 25, 1985 
Dana Larson Roubal & Assoc. 
19 West South Temple 
Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
As of this date we are D are not D bondable for an amount in 
excess of the enclosed bid We will D will not D bond this 
project (premium by general contractor) 
Our bondman is KJSfir-l Qrd , Phone # 
State License # 35B5?-B State Bid Limit $500,(WO 
We acknowledge seeing addenda # .none , 
(No acknowledgement means "None") 
Inc. 
Re: West Jr. High School 
Roosevelt, Utah 
Interior Brick Seal 
Gentlemen: 
We will apply one coat of DEM-STOP to the Auditorium side walls at 
a level of 714"(from the rear ) platform, stairs and vestibule, and 
rooms 101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109, the music room and the sorting 
room for the price indicated below: 
£ PROPOSE to furnish labor and material — complete in accordance with above specifications, and subject to conditions 
tund on both sides of this agreement, for the sum of 
*Two thousand seven hundred eighty and no/100- dollars (I2J80.00
 } 
Payment to be made as follows' _ Tn f u l l upon completion. 
ACCEPTED The above prices, specifications and conditions are 
satisfactory and are hereby accepted You are authorized to do 
the work as specified Payment will be made as outlined above 
No interest charge if paid within 30 days 1 Wo interest per month 
or 1B% per year charged on all past due accounts 
Date of Acceptance 
By _ 
Note This proposal may be withdrawn by us it not accepted 
within days 
All material is guaranteed to be as specified All work to be 
completed in a workmanlike manner according to standard 
practices Any alteration or deviation from above specifications 
involving extra costs will be executed only upon written orders, 
and will become an extra charge over and above the estimate All 
agreements contingent upon strikes, accidents or delays oevond 
our control Owner to carry fire tornado and other necessary 


















^ Mr,?./Randy. G r e e n ^ U - -,,,,,: 
D^ANA£LARSONl ROUBA t^f ASSOCV INC! 
| l9Wes^5oa|TempT:e%- , * ? * * » * 
t-Siilte-600B^^^f-.'••-•. 






please!: .s iVindicat ing your acceptance"and mall; the o r i g i n a l i , l ^ ! p 
^back;:.t61:m^^^ 
^ycoBHB^A - / i:ptrERS? 
Ted/Peter^^^tt1" 
, . ; i v : ^ ^ ^ - ^ 
Enclosure^ 
«! CM 
r i m )
 U / < n as-
Ol l i lR D r >P**- . 
IECT: West J r . H i g h S c h o o l A d d i t i o n CHANCE ORIHR NUMUtR : v IfS-W 
e. address) R o o s e v e l t . UT 
INI I IA1 ION DA IE: J+-20-P>5 
Contractor): 
j 1 ARCI I I I ICT 'S I'ROIECT N O : ^ 5 1 0 2 8 3 0 0 
ABCO Construction CONIRACI (OR: General Construction 
2 ^ 5 North 7600 West 
, Corinne, UT 8^307 , 
I | C O N IKAC 1 I M I t : Ma rch 5 , 1 9 ^ 
c directed to make the fo l lowing (.honors in l l i is Contract: 
Clean brick after it had been sealed. 
Material 63.85 
97.5 hr § 20/hr 1,950.00 
2,013.80 
Overhead & Profit 15% 302.07 
$2,315.87 
1 sitytH'tl Ity hollt llic IKxiicr *m\ AMlii l i- iI 
M" f'tmtrMkW Itwtir<lll"< hi* .t({iiTilirnl tirieuilli. iniluilim1, .u\) ,ttl|ii<Jui<-iii in llic ( I IMI I .KI Vint m < iinlr.iil lime 
C.onlr.itl Sum) (Gunianlecd Maximum Cosl) w.i<i $ 
Y previously nulhorizod Change Otdcrs $ 
Sum) (GunMitleed Maximum Cost) piiur hi litis Change Outer \va< $ 
Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum L'osl) will he (im reaped) (det teased) (IMKI».TII|;C<I) 
mnnc Order $ 
r.ic.l Sum) ((iii.it,nnlccd Maximum Gtsl) im ludini; this Chnni'c Older will he . . . $ 
imc wil l he (increased) (detreasrd) (un<hait|;ed) hy ' ( 12 (Days 
hslanlial Complclion as of the dale of litis Change Older thetefnre is 
Authorised. 
on, Roubal & Assoc* ABCO Construction Uintah School D i s t r i c t 
h Temple. Suite 600 (2%j?NWorth 7600 West ov%Jj> West 200 South 
A«MH*M> Addicts 
U t y t UT 8*H01 Corinne, UT 8'»307 Vernnl, Utnh 
MY MY 
I M H DA ft 
•f • CIIANC.f DKOIK • A m i Vim f 1)11 If IN' • MA' • •"••1711 
ffcMtf Ol AKf IMUC'tS, t;r»NtW>OKk A\f . N\V W \MIIN<.M»N IM JIMNM. C70 I --- I97B 
CilAmvjt 
ORDER 
















CHANGE ORDER NUMBER: 
INITIATION DATE: 
ARCHITECT'S PROJECT N O : 
CONTRACT FOR: 
I ( CONTRACT DATE: 
You are directed to make the fo l lowing changes in this Contract: 
/ / •^ /.W/r-. y V ' / A ^ ' j • 
X /A*i G U ^ yo. 
^JL J & J£fo S?M,,57u > " ' •<-< 3cy^Ctr6's> 
Not valid until signed by both the Owner and Architect. 
Signature of the Contractor indicates his agreement herewith, including any adjustment in the Contract Sum or Co 
The original (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) was $ 
Net change by previously authorized Change Orders $ 
The (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) prior to this Change Order was $ 
The (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) will be (increased) (decreased) (unchanged) 
by this Change Order $ 
The new (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Cost) including this Change Order will be . . . $ 
The Contract Time will be (increased) (decreased) (unchanged) by 
The Date of Substantial Completion as of the date of this Change Order therefore is 
Authorized: 
ARCHITECT CONTRACIOR OWNER 
Address Address Address 
BY. BY. BY_ 
MTE DATE DATE 
\ D O C U M E N T C701 • CHANGE ORDER • APRIL 1978 EDITION • AIA* • <D 197fl 
\MERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 17J5 NEW YORK AVE , N.W.. WASMINC.K >N D C 20006 
EXHIBIT " D 
Any damagee to the OenefeJ Contractor for delay caused by the Subcontractor shall be deducted by the General Contractor from the agreed price for said work, subj 
however, to the option of the General Contractor to terminate said Subcontract for default as herein elsewhere provided. 
The General Contractor shall not be liable to the Subcontractor for delay to the Subcontractor's work by the ect. neglect or default of the Owner. General Contractor or t 
Architect, or by reeaon of fire or other casualty, or on account of riots or of strikes, or other combined action of the workmen or others, or on account of any acts of God. 
any other cauee beyond General Contractor's control or on account of any circumstances caused or contributed to by the Subcontractor; provided, however, notwlthstandi 
anything else contained herein, the General Contractor will be liable to the Subcontractor for damages he incurs as a result of any acts or failures to act by the Owner whi 
delays or suspends the Subcontractor's work only to the extent the Owner Is liable tor such damages and actually pays the General Contractor for such damages. It bei 
expressly understood that the only obligation the General Contractor has to Subcontractor under this proviso Is to pass on to the Owner any claim Subcontractor has I 
damages or delays caused by Owner and to pay to Subcontractor as a result of the Subcontractor's claim for delays caused by the Owner. 
The Subcontractor expressly agrees that an extension of time shall constitute the Subcontractor's sole and exclusive remedy should the Subcontractor be delayed, integer 
with, disrupted, or hindered In his work by the General Contractor, in which case the General Contractor shall owe the Subcontractor therefore only an extension of time f 
completion equal to the delay caused and then only If a written notice of delay Is made to the contractor within forty-eight (48) hours from the time of the beginning of ti 
delay, Interference, disruption, or hindrance; and under no circumstances shall the General Contractor be liable to pay to the Subcontractor any compensation tor su< 
General Contractor-caused delays. The Subcontractor acknowledges and agrees that the Subcontractors failure to give a written notice of delay as prescribed here 
constitutes a waiver by the Subcontractor to any extension of time for such delay, disruption, Interference or hindrance. 
The Subcontractor's written notice of delay must be by certified mail and on a form provided by or suitable to the General Contractor and contain evidence establishing th, 
the delay In completion of the work arises from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Subcontract The General Contractc 
shall eecertaln the facts and the extent of the delay end extend the time for completing the Subcontract, when in his sole judgment and discretion an extension 
epproprterte. The GenereJ Contractor's findings shall be final and conclusive as to the Subcontractor s entitlement for time extensions. 
THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, may, at any time, on written order, without notice to the surety and without Invalidating this Subcontract, make changes in the work herei 
contracted for and the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as directed by the General Contractor's written order. Any claim for an extension of time (o 
completion or tor adjustment of the Subcontract oriee shall be resolved at the time the General Contractor directs performance of the extra or changed work and, In abeenc* 
of a written confirmation given/by the General Contractor of the amount of such an extension or ad|ustment at the time such extra or changed work is ordered, it i 
expressly understood that no such extension or adjustment is due the Subcontractor for performance of the changed or extra work. If the changed or extr* 
work causes an Increeee or decrease In the Subcontrector's cost of per forms nee of the Subcontract work, or in the time required for performance, within a reasonable hn>» 
after the General Contractor's written order, the Subcontrector shall submit to the General Contractor an estimate showing what effect the proposed extra work or change n 
estimated to have on the Subcontrector price; and, If after receipt of such estimate the General Contractor gives the Subcontractor written authority for such extra work ano 
for the adjustment of the Subcontract price In accordance with such estimate, the Subcontractor shall perform such extra work and the Subcontract price shall be adjusted t y 
the amount set forth In such estimate, provided that no payment shall be due the Subcontractor for such changed or extra work until the General Contractor has receiver 
payment from the Owner for said changed or extra work performed by the Subcontractor. 
It Is expressly agreed that except in an emergency endangering life or property no additions or changes to the work shall be made except upon written order of the Gen^ai 
Contractor, and the General Contractor shall not be liable to the Subcontrector for any extra labor, materials, or equipment furnished without such written order No officer 
employee or agent of the General Contractor la authorized to direct any extra work or changed work by oral order. 
Nothing herein contained shall excuse the Subcontractor from proceeding promptly with the prosecution of the work as ordered In writing by the General Contractor, SIK> 
tenure to do to ahell constitute a broach of this Subcontract. 
THE SUBCONTRACTOR AGREES to Indemnify the General Contractor against and hold the Contractor harmless for any and all claims, demands, liabilities, losses 
expenses, suits, and actions (Including attorney's feee) tor or on account of any injury to any person, or any death at any time resulting from such Injury, or any damage to 
any property, which may arise for which may be alleged to have arisen) out of or In connection with the work covered by this Subcontract even though such injury, death >. 
Jamage may be (or may be alleged to be) attributable In part to negligence or other fault on the part of the General Contractor or his officers, agents or employees i r -
>6l»gatlon of the Subcontractor to Indemnify and hold the General Contractor harmless shall not be enforceable If and only If it be determined by arbitration or judici* 
ffocoading that the injury, death or damages complained of was attributable solely to the fault or negligence of the General Contractor or his officers, agents, or employee 
nd not In any manner In any part attributable to the Subcontractor The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the General Contractor for all sums which the Gene'a. 
ontractor may pay or be compelled to pay In settlement of any claim hereunder, including any claim under the provisions of any workmen's compensation lew or any put 
x employees benefits which the General Contractor may adopt The General Contractor shall be entitled to withhold from any payment otherwise due pursuant to this 
ubcontract such amount or amounts as may be reasonably necessary to protect It against liability for any personal injury, death or property damage resulting from th« 
irtormanoa of the work hereunder. 
HE SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL KEEP HIMSELF and the General Contractor fully advised as to ail pertinent local and regional labor agreements and practices, lnclud» n, 
>y toca) labor union contract negotiations occurring during the term of this Subcontract. In the event the Subcontrector has a collective bargaining agreement, either locai* 
nationally, with a labor union engaged In local negotiations or If the Subcontractor will be affected, either directly or indirectly, by the outcome of said local negotiation* 
a Subcontractor agrees to join said negotiations, If legally permissible, and participate or associate itself with the local contractor or contractors Involved in sa>w 
QOtJoxione In en endeavor to reeotve the labor dispute. 
I labor used throughout the work shall be acceptable to the Owner and the General Contractor and of a standing or affiliation that will permit the work to be carried on 
rmontouety and without delay, and that will In no oaae or under any circumstances cause any disturbance, interference or delay to the progress of the building, structured 
factttttee, or any other work being carried on by the Owner or the General Contractor in any other town or city in the United States. 
i Subcontractor agrees that where hie work or the General Contractor's work is stopped or delayed or interfered with by strikes, slow downs, or work interruption 
jlting from the acts or failure to act of the employee of the Subcontractor In concert, or by any breech of the provisions above, then the General Contractor, at his option 
' terminate this Subcontract and proceed In accordance with the provisions of the Subcontract. The General Contractor shall have the remediee provided for herein eve 
*gh the Subcontractor's employees may be engaging In work stoppage solely as s result of a labor dispute Involving the Generel Contractor or others and not in <* 
mar Involving the Subcontractor. 
iASE Of ANY DISPUTE between the Subcontractor and General Contractor, the Subcontractor agrees to be bound to the General Contractor to the same extent that »• 
ire! Contractor Is bound to the Owner by the terms of the General Contract and by any and all decisions or determinations made thereunder by the parly or board > 
orlzed In the General Contract. The Subcontractor also agrees to be bound to General Contractor to the same extent the General Contractor Is bound to Owner Dy r • 
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not Subcontrector is s party to such proceeding If such a dispute is prosecuted or defended by the Gem* -
rector against Owner under the terms of the General Contract or In court action, the Subcontractor agrees to furnish all documents, statements, witnesses, and 01 
matton required by the GenereJ Contractor for such purpose end to pay or reimburse General Contractor for all expenses and costs, If any, incurred in conn** 
with. It Is expressly understood that aa to any and all work done and agreed to be done by the Subcontractor and as to any and ail materials, equipment or ser . 
ihed or agreed to be furnished by Subcontractor, as to eny and all damages, if any, incurred by Subcontrector. in connection with this project, the General Contf«. 
never be liable to the Subcontrector to eny greater extent than the Owner Is liable to Gener J Contractor No dispute shall interfere with the progress of construe 
to Subcontractor agrees to proceed with his work as directed. 0espite disputes he may have against the General Contractor, the Owner, or other parlies 
, w « ut-OORATING 
H24 SOUTH RICHARDS STREET • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8410 
L TED G. PETERS 801-355.2500 VERA C. PETERS ** 
XHIBIT 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
Route 1 Box 116 
Corlnne, Utah 84307 
MIIIAOB DATE July 5, 1984 
Please find enclosed the contract on 
the WEST JR. HIGH SCHOOL AUDITORIUM 
ADDITION. I ammended the contract to 
read as it was stated on the depository 
bid sheet. The alternates should not 
change the contract. We estimate approx. 
65 man days of labor. The number of days 
depends on how much is ready for us. A 
5 man qTeTT'Wfluld bex*rtS6lTpfcw&-weeks. 
Ted Peter* tersJufe-
R E P L Y 
DATE 
* M V I M f M MC-OMOM No MWO--P.»*d «i USA 
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